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Overview
Questions about the interface between the multilateral climate regime embodied in the Kyoto
Protocol and the multilateral trade regime embodied in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
have become especially timely since the fall of 2001. At that time, ministerial-level meetings
in Marrakech and Doha agreed to advance the agendas, respectively, for the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol and for negotiations on further agreements at the WTO. There have
been concerns that each of these multilateral arrangements could constrain the effectiveness
of the other, and these concerns will become more salient with the entry into force of the
Kyoto Protocol. There are questions about whether and how the rights and obligations of the
members of the WTO and the parties to the Protocol may conflict. Of particular concern is
whether provisions in the Protocol, as well as government policies and business activities
undertaken in keeping with those provisions, may conflict with the WTO non-discrimination
principles of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment.
The WTO agreements that are potentially relevant to climate change issues include many of
the individual Uruguay Round agreements and subsequent agreements as well. The principal
elements of the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly relevant are its provisions concerning
emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, enforcement,
and parties’ policies and measures. In combination, therefore, there are numerous potential
points of intersection between the elements of the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO agreements.
Previous studies have clarified many issues, as they have focused on particular aspects of the
regimes’ relationships. Yet, some analyses suggest that the two regimes are largely
compatible and even mutually reinforcing, while others suggest that there are significant
conflicts between them. Those and other studies are referenced in the ‘suggestions for further
reading’ section at the end of the paper.1
The present paper seeks to expand on those studies by providing additional breadth and depth
to understanding of the issues. The analysis gives special attention to key issues on the agenda
– i.e. issues that are particularly problematic because of the likelihood of occurrence of
specific conflicts and the significance of their economic and/or political consequences. The
paper adopts a modified ‘triage’ approach, which classifies points of intersection as (a) highly
problematic and clearly in need of further attention, (b) perhaps problematic but less urgent,
and (c) apparently not problematic, at least at this point in time.
The principal conclusions are that:
· The missions and objectives of the two regimes are largely compatible, and their
operations are potentially mutually reinforcing in several respects.
                                                
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University School of Business, Washington, DC, and Associate Fellow,
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels
1 See especially Brack, Grubb and Windram (2000), Mueller (2002), Parker (1998), Petsonk (1999), Sampson
(1999, 2001, forthcoming), Werksman (1999), Werksman and Santoro (1999), Werksman, Baumert and Dubash
(2001), Wiser (1999), Zhang (1998), Zhang and Assuncao (nd).
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· Some provisions of the multilateral agreements that may superficially seem at odds are
not likely to become particularly problematic in practice.
· ‘Domestic policies and measures’ that governments may undertake in the context of
the Protocol could pose difficult issues in the context of WTO dispute cases.
· Recent WTO agreements and dispute cases acknowledge the legitimacy of the
‘precautionary principle’ and are thus consistent with the environmental protection
objectives of the Protocol.
· The relative newness of the climate regime creates opportunities for institutional
adaptation, as compared with the constraints of tradition in the trade-investment
regime.
· The prospect of largely independent evolutionary paths for the two regimes poses a
series of issues about future international regime design and management, which may
require new institutional arrangements.
In sum, the present paper thus finds that although there are some areas of interaction that are
problematic, the two regimes may nevertheless co-exist in relative harmony in other respects
–more like ‘neighbours’ than either ‘friends’ or ‘foes’, as Krist (2001) has suggested.
Diplomatic Context
Although it is widely agreed that the relationships between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO
are important – and require further consideration – negotiations concerning them in the WTO
may be precluded from the Doha round. The language of the Doha ministerial declaration is
quite restrictive on this issue. Negotiations are limited to ‘the relationship between existing
WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO
rules as among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO
rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question’ (paragraph 31, italics added).
Of course, such constraints in the WTO Doha round do not preclude a discussion in other fora
– such as follow-up meetings to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, or in
meetings in conjunction with other diplomatic processes. In one forum or another – and
probably in many – representatives of governments, firms and NGOs will be confronting the
issues. In any case, issues about Kyoto Protocol-WTO relationships are already being raised
by individuals and by organisations, as evidenced by the growing body of studies cited in
footnote 1 and in the references section. In that sense, the issues are already unofficially on
the international trade-environment agenda. Even in the absence of their formal consideration
in the WTO Doha round, they will be receiving increasing attention.
Within the WTO, a dispute case could prompt a formal consideration of some aspects of the
relationship. Furthermore, climate change mitigation measures are already in effect at the
national, sub-national and international levels. This is a reality that prompts questions about
the international trade and investment implications of such extant measures as carbon taxes,
emissions standards, subsidies for production technologies, labelling and certification
standards for product efficiency, and markets for emission permits. It is prudent, therefore, to
continue to advance understanding of the issues, as the Kyoto Protocol enters into force and
as the WTO elaborates new rules during the Doha round.2
                                                
2 The issues and institutional aspects of the climate regime and trade-investment regime will evolve
diplomatically as part of a wider set of issues concerning MEAs and the WTO. Taking a cue from the lexicon of
acronyms about the relationship of trade measures to investment measures – i.e. Trade Related Investment
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Stated Objectives of the WTO and Kyoto Protocol
The stated objectives of the two multilateral regimes converge, and the two are officially
expected to be mutually supportive.3 These themes are evident in key documents for both
regimes, as follows:
Article 2:3 of the Kyoto Protocol notes that parties should ‘strive to implement policies and
measures…in such a way as to minimise adverse effects, including the adverse effects…on
international trade…’
Article 3.5 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) notes that ‘The parties
should cooperate to promote [an]…open international economic system’ and that ‘measures
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade’.
As for the WTO, in the Doha Communiqué, the members observe that ‘the aims of upholding
and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for
the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must
be mutually supportive’.
The beginning of the Preamble to the Marakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO) notes… ‘The parties to this agreement, [r]ecognizing that their relations
in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living…while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, ….’
Potential Tangible Outcomes of Interactions
In the context of these generalised expressions of mutual support, specific activities of the two
regimes offer a range of potential tangible outcomes for climate change mitigation and trade
liberalisation. While some interactions of the two regimes offer the prospect of win-win
outcomes, others pose the possibility of less benign outcomes. The matrix in Figure 1 depicts
the full range of possible outcomes in terms of their consequences for climate change
mitigation and for trade liberalisation.
Examples of win-win possibilities, represented by cell 1, include reductions of barriers to
international trade and investment in goods and services related to climate change mitigation
– barriers such as tariffs on windmill turbines or restrictions on foreign direct investment in
(alternative) energy firms. Reduction of barriers to international business transactions in
environmental goods and services is an item on the agenda of the current round of
negotiations at the WTO, but it remains to be seen whether any such agreements will concern
transactions that are specifically related to climate change mitigation. An example of another
                                                                                                                                                        
Measures (TRIMs) and Investment Related Trade Measures (IRTMs) – which have been identified in the WTO
context, one can identify ‘Environment Related Trade Measures (ERTMs)’ and ‘Environment Related
Investment Measures (ERIMs)’. At the same time, international environmental agreements contain numerous
provisions that affect governments’ trade and investment policies and corporations’ international business
practices. Thus, one can identify Trade Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) and Investment Related
Environmental Measures (IREMs). This policy paper specifically focuses on WTO-Kyoto Protocol interfaces
and thus on WTO ERTMs and ERIMs concerning climate change, and on Kyoto Protocol TREMs and IREMs.
3 The preambles of international accords and communiqués from ministerial meetings do not necessarily entail
precise commitments to specific tangible actions; however, they do establish a diplomatic-political context that
influences subsequent negotiations and decisions.
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win-win possibility would be the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies, but this is not currently on
the WTO agenda.
Figure 1. Outcome Matrix for Climate Regime / Trade-Investment Regime Interactions
Climate Change MitigationTrade-
Investment
Liberalisation Beneficial Neutral Detrimental
Beneficial 1 2 3
Neutral 4 5 6
Detrimental 7 8 9
Potential conflict areas where win-lose (cell 3) outcomes can occur include disputes where
there is tension between trade-discriminatory elements of climate policies that focus on
differences in production methods, as contrasted with the application of the WTO non-
discrimination principles to production process methods. Further, whereas the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) explicitly endorses the ‘precautionary principle’
when there is uncertainty about the scientific evidence concerning the damages from trade,
the WTO has only recently and tentatively begun to subscribe to such a notion, as for instance
in the Technical Barriers to Trade agreement and in some dispute case decisions. More
generally, lose-lose outcomes (cell 9) could occur, for instance, if conflicts such as disputes at
the WTO or issues concerning US or other countries’ non-participation in the Protocol
undermine confidence in both regimes.
Unlike many other multilateral environmental agreements, there are no provisions for trade
sanctions in the Protocol (cell 8). In this respect, therefore, the two regimes are at least
superficially compatible in legalistic terms. However, in more fundamental political terms,
restrictive trade measures could nevertheless be adopted outside the terms of the Protocol to
exert pressure on governments to become a party to the Kyoto Protocol or to comply more
fully with its rules (cell 7), in order to offset the competitive effects of non-participation in the
Kyoto Protocol. 4
Questions about the Interfaces of the Regimes
In order to understand the nature of specific tangible issues that might arise within such
interfaces, it is of course necessary to address a variety of specific questions. Such questions
include the following:
What types of international business transactions in goods, services and other business
activities in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto are covered by WTO agreements – and
which are not?
Which WTO agreements are applicable to the climate regime – and which are not?
                                                
4 There is a principle in international law that, when there are conflicts between international agreements,
subsequent agreements prevail over previous agreements. However, applications of this relatively
straightforward principle can be complicated, for instance, by questions about the chronology of agreements. As
for relationships between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol, there might be such questions because the GATT
preceded the FCCC, which preceded the WTO, which preceded the Kyoto Protocol. There are other legal issues
as well that could pertain to conflicts between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol. In any case, it seems likely that
the legal issues would be subordinated to political considerations driven by economic and other interests.
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Are there differences in the implications for the climate regime between the GATT (covering
goods) and the GATS (covering services)?
Would offsetting border measures qualify as ‘exceptions’ according to provisions concerning
non-discrimination in GATT Article XX and/or GATS Article XIV?
Are climate change measures concerning the labelling and certification of energy efficiency
compatible with the WTO agreement on technical barriers?
Are firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, which are central to the Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) provisions, covered in the
WTO by both the GATS and the agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)?
Will CDM and JI projects under the Protocol qualify as environmental exceptions under the
WTO subsidies agreement?
Are firms’ projects and/or governments’ policies involving carbon sequestration restricted by
the WTO agriculture agreement?
What are the implications for climate-trade interactions for countries such as the United States
that are not parties to the Protocol but are members of the WTO?
Are regional climate agreements affected by the WTO provisions concerning regional trade
agreements?
Are climate regime issues likely to become involved in the WTO dispute settlement process?
This paper does not attempt to answer conclusively all of these questions; rather it highlights
areas of particular concern and/or complexity. Almost inevitably for a subject of such broad
scope, some questions remain unanswered and new ones are raised.
The Nature of Climate Mitigation Activities in Relationship to WTO Agreements
Questions concerning the types of international transactions in goods, services and other
business activities in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol that are covered by
WTO agreements can be answered only if the emission credits and other elements of the
Kyoto mechanisms can be defined in the context of WTO agreements. Thus a key question is:
What kinds of ‘things’ do the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol entail that might
raise issues in the WTO? Are Allocated Allowance Units (AAUs), Emission Reduction Units
(ERUs) and Credit Emission Reductions (CERs) goods or services or something else?
These items in the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms have been variously described as
involving the following: carbon and thus commodities, services such as ‘decarbonisation’,
permits that convey property rights, financial instruments, and investment goods. At the same
time, CDM and JI projects represent foreign direct investment projects, which also involve
trade in goods as well as provide services. Because of ambiguities about some distinctions
(e.g. the difference between goods and services) in WTO agreements, there is not yet a
consensus on these basic issues of coverage.
However, if emission credits are defined as services to which the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) applies, then there is a question about whether the most favoured
nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination would be violated. Limiting the trading of
emission permits to Kyoto Protocol parties could violate GATS Article 1. Further, if emission
trading privileges are linked to compliance with other Kyoto Protocol provisions, this could
also violate the WTO MFN principle. Analogous issues about violations of MFN arise in
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connection with Kyoto Protocol provisions concerning Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.
All three of the so-called flexibility mechanisms of the Protocol are potentially covered by
one or more WTO agreements. The GATS seems more likely than the GATT to be applicable
to international emissions trading. Both the GATT and GATS as well as several other
agreements – including the agriculture agreement, the subsidies agreement, and the TRIMs
agreement – are potentially applicable to JI and CDM projects.
Border Measures as Exceptions to the GATT and GATS
Another question that has been attracting interest concerns governments’ border measures
undertaken in the context of the Protocol to offset the international competitive effects of
domestic carbon emission reduction measures such as carbon taxes: Would offsetting border
measures qualify as allowable ‘exceptions’ under GATT Article XX and/or GATS Article
XIV provisions concerning non-discrimination? Cases undertaken in the future in the context
of the WTO dispute settlement process may provide detailed answers to this question. In the
meantime, preliminary analyses suggest that the distinction between products and production
process methods that has been central to GATT/WTO dispute cases in the past will be a key
determinant of the fate of such climate-related measures in the WTO.
GATT Article XX provides that ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any Member of measures: …(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health;….’ GATT Article XX also provides in section (g) that ‘measures relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ are exempted.
The services agreement (GATS) also contains environment-related provisions. Although it
does not have an exactly equivalent provision to GATT Article XX (g) concerning
‘exhaustible natural resources’, the GATS preamble and Article XIV(b) are otherwise nearly
identical to the provisions of GATT Article XX. Those portions of GATS are as follows:
‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between counties where like
conditions [cf. ‘the same conditions’ in GATT] prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in
services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures: …(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;….’
As a result of these provisions and a series of WTO dispute cases concerning potential
environmental exceptions to the GATT principle of national treatment, it is possible to
construct a ‘logical decision tree’ that represents a series of ‘tests’ that a measure must pass in
order for it to be considered an allowable exception (see Figure 2).5 There are many parallels
between GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV; indeed many of the tests in Figure 1 are
identical for the two agreements. However, there are also some differences; for instance, the
product-process test in step 1 for GATT is different for GATS because of course the product
is a service not a good.
                                                
5 This decision tree has been constructed partly on the basis of the verbal discussion in Sampson (forthcoming).
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Figure 2. Decision Tree for Exceptions to GATT Article XX
1. Is the target a product or a process?
product  process
ok
2. Is the process domestic or foreign?
domestic foreign
ok
3. Does the measure discriminate against ‘like products’?
no yes
ok
4. Is the measure ‘necessary’ to protect the environment?
no yes
not ok
5. Does the measure constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ discrimination
or a ‘disguised restriction’ on trade?
yes no
not ok
6. Is the measure less trade restrictive than available alternatives?
yes no
not ok
7. Are the affected lives or resources in the country imposing the
barrier?
no yes
not ok ok
If 4, 5, 6 or 7, not ok
8. Does the measure qualify for a GATT Article IX waiver?
no yes
not ok ok
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The tests at steps 2 and 7 may be the most problematic for climate regime. As for step 7, the
truly global dispersion of greenhouse gases means that the affected lives and resources are
inevitably in countries other than – as well as in – the country imposing the trade barrier.6
Regional and Bi-lateral Arrangements
GATT Article XXIV allows regional customs unions and free trade areas as exceptions to the
most favored nation principle if several conditions are met, including that barriers to imports
from outside are not higher than before the establishment of the regional arrangement. As a
practical matter, such arrangements are not usually challenged, and there is no reason to
expect problems for regional or bilateral climate regime schemes – whether undertaken in the
context of the Kyoto Protocol or independently of it.
There are many regional and bilateral agreements concerning foreign direct investment (FDI)
outside the WTO, and this is a topic needing more extensive consideration in light of their
number, scope and complexity.
Environmental Standards in Relationship to the WTO Technical Barriers Agreement
Another topic requiring further analysis is whether climate change measures concerning the
labelling and certification of energy efficiency be compatible with the WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers (TBT).
The Kyoto Protocol provides in Article 2, paragraph 1(a)(i), for domestic energy efficiency
policies and measures that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions for ‘enhancement of energy
efficiency in relevant sectors of the economy’. However, because it does not explicitly specify
the types of policies and measures that would be appropriate, there is uncertainty about
whether the particular policies and measures that are actually adopted might conflict with
WTO rules.
CDM and JI Projects in Relation to the WTO Subsidies Agreement
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) treats as a non-
actionable subsidy government assistance to industry covering up to 20 per cent of the cost of
adapting existing facilities to new environmental legislation. Non-actionable subsidies are
those that cannot be challenged as a basis for undertaking countervailing duties. In Part IV,
Article 8; 8.1, the agreement says:
‘The following subsidies shall be considered as non-actionable:…8.2(c) assistance to promote
adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or
regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the
assistance:
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and
(iii) does not cover the cost or replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be
fully borne by firms; and
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm’s planned reduction of nuisances and
pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved;
                                                
6 There is a simple logical issue and an analytically simple solution to this problem – namely, change the WTO
phrase ‘are the’ to ‘are there’. Politically, however, such a change would probably not be easy (and perhaps not
possible).
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and is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production
processes’.
These provisions prompt the question of whether CDM and JI projects qualify as
environmental exceptions. Answering this question is complicated by a basic difference
between the Protocol and the WTO. The Protocol explicitly and directly applies to firms’
activities as well as governments’ measures, while the WTO applies directly only to the latter.
Indeed, firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI) projects are central to the Protocol’s CDM and
JI provisions, whereas FDI is covered only selectively in the WTO agreements, particularly in
the GATS and TRIMs.
Thus, the relevance of WTO agreements to any particular CDM or JI projects will depend on
whether the project involves trade and/or FDI and whether it involves goods and/or services.
Some projects could of course a combination of two or more of the four possibilities that are
evident.
Carbon Sequestration in Relationship to the WTO Agriculture Agreement
The Agreement on Agriculture exempts subsidies in the form of direct payments under
environmental programmes from governments’ commitments to reduce domestic support for
agricultural production. The exception, however, is subject to certain conditions, and they are
quite complex and vague. They can be noted, in part, as follows:
‘Payments (a) Eligibility for … payments [under environmental programmes] shall be
determined as part of a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation
programme and be dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions related to production
methods or inputs. (b) The amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of
income involved in complying with the government programmes’ (Annex II, paragraph 12).
The issue here, then is whether particular agricultural subsidies for carbon sequestration
projects will meet such criteria in order to be exempt from the WTO restrictions.
WTO Dispute Settlement Process and Cases
Additional questions about the Kyoto Protocol-WTO interface concern WTO disputes: Are
Protocol-related disputes likely to arise in the WTO? What Protocol provisions, government
policies or firm practices are the most likely to prompt WTO disputes? How are they likely to
be decided? What would be the consequences for the climate and trade-investment regimes?
What are the most relevant previous dispute cases, and how have they been decided? The
answers to such questions will depend at least as much on the political and economic
circumstances pertaining to an individual case as on the legal technicalities.
In order for a dispute case to be considered and decided in the WTO dispute settlement
process, the case must pass through several stages. These often include a firm (or firms)
asking their government to take the case to the WTO, after which a government decides to
make a claim. The case must then go through several formal WTO stages. There must
therefore be a combination of economic, political and legal factors that lead the complaining
government to initiate a case.
Technical legal issues and the factual circumstances of the case are obviously central to the
arguments and outcomes. But, in addition, economic interests of play a central role in the
decisions of complaining firms and governments about whether to make a claim and in the
decisions of responding governments (and firms) about how to approach the case.
Furthermore, domestic and international political considerations also come into play as
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governments (and firms) decide whether and how to pursue cases on the basis of calculations
concerning political support and opposition. Once the case enters the WTO dispute process,
the mixture of economic, political and legal factors changes, particularly if the case is not
settled during preliminary negotiations and it becomes an item on the formal agenda of a
dispute panel. Then legal issues tend to become more important.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the restrictions on the WTO Doha round agenda, issues about the
interactions of the climate regime and the trade-investment regime are now on the de facto
agenda of environmental and economic diplomacy. Linkages between the climate regime
centred in the Kyoto Protocol and the trade-investment regime centred in the WTO are not
likely to be formally discussed during the Doha round of negotiations; however, those issues
are likely to be addressed in other forums over the next several years. Because the
institutionalisation of the Kyoto Protocol is still in its formative phase and because the results
of the Doha round negotiations will not be known for three or more years, the precise
implications of the overlaps between the two regimes are also uncertain.
However, priorities can be established – in at least a preliminary way – for the agenda
according to three categories of issues: (1) those that are most problematic; (2) those that
might become problematic but are less urgent; and (3) those that do not appear at this point to
be problematic.
(1) Interactions that are the most problematic. Some of the rights and obligations of the
parties to both the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO agreements are arguably in jeopardy and
need diplomatic as well as analytic attention. In particular, the use of border measures to
offset differences in the energy costs of goods is in this category.
(2) Interactions that are less problematic but that warrant further attention. These include
whether and how WTO disputes might arise from trade-related activities under the climate
regime, environmental standards in relationship to the WTO technical barriers agreement,
CDM and JI projects in relation to the WTO subsidies agreement, and carbon
sequestration in relationship to the WTO agriculture agreement.
(3) Interactions that appear not to be problematic at this time. Because regional trade
arrangements have not generally been challenged in the WTO, regional climate
arrangements are also not likely to be. Because the government procurement agreement is
only a ‘plurilateral’ agreement not including many members of the WTO and excludes
many areas from its coverage by individual country opt-outs, it also is not likely to be
problematic for climate regime interactions.
In any case, both the climate regime and the trade-investment regime will undergo recurrent
changes to accommodate new economic and political circumstances. It is therefore important
to continue to monitor and analyse the relationships between the two regimes as they evolve.
Such an effort should be undertaken not only in legal terms but also in economic and political
terms in order to understand their implications for the diplomatic agendas of governments, the
strategic choices of firms and the policy concerns of NGOs.
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE WTO
11
References and Suggestions for Further Reading
Araya, Monica (2001). ‘Environmental Dilemmas on the Road to Doha: Winning Southern
Support for Greening the WTO,’ Trade and the Environment, The WTO, and MEAs
(Washington, DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation); pp. 109-118.
Assuncao, Lucas (nd). Trade Rules and Climate Change Policy: Some Issues of Synergy and
Conflict (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development).
Assuncao, Lucas (2000). The Climate Change Convention and Trade Regimes, in P. Koenz,
C. Bellman and L. Assuncao, eds. Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development: A
Reader (Tokyo: United Nations University).
Baron, Richard, et al. (1996). ‘Policies and Measures for Common Action,’ Working Paper 4,
in Economic/Fiscal Instruments: Taxation. Expert Group on UNFCCC. Paris:
OECD/IEA. [Section 3.2.2.3]
Barrett, Brendan F.D., and W. Bradnee Chambers (1998). ‘Primer on Scientific Knowledge
and Politics in the Evolving Global Climate Regime: COP 3 and the Kyoto Protocol’.
(Tokyo: United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies).
Brack, Duncan (1998). ‘International Trade and Environment’, in Brian Hocking and Steven
McGuire (eds.), Trade Politics (London and New York: Routledge).
Brack, Duncan (2000). The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. ICTSD/RIIA Side Event to
UNFCCC/COP-6. <www.ictsd.org>
Brack, Duncan, with Michael Grubb and Craig Windram (2000). International Trade and
Climate Change Policies (London: RIIA and Earthscan).
Brewer, Thomas L. (1995). ‘International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The
Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment’, Law and Policy in International
Business, 26, 3: 633-672.
Brewer, Thomas L. (ed.) (1999). Trade and Investment Policy, 2 volumes (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar).
Brewer, Thomas L. (2000). ‘Greening International Business at the World Trade
Organization?: Agreements, Disputes, Agendas’. AIB-UK Conference (Strathclyde
University, Glasgow).
Brewer, Thomas L., and Stephen Young (1998). ‘Investment Issues at the World Trade
Organization: The Architecture of Rules and the Settlement of Disputes,’ Journal of
International Economic Law, 1: 457-470.
Brewer, Thomas L., and Stephen Young (2000). The Multilateral Investment System and
Multinational Enterprises (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Brewer, Thomas L., and Stephen Young (2001). ‘The Multilateral Regime for FDI:
Institutions and Their Implications for Business Strategy,’ in Alan M. Rugman and
Thomas L. Brewer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Business (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press); pp. 282-313.
Buck, Matthias, and Roda Verheyen (2001). ‘International Trade Law and Climate Change –
A Positive Way Forward’ (Bonn).
THOMAS L. BREWER
12
Byron, Neil (2001). ‘Risk, the Environment and MEAs,’ in David Robertson and Aynsley
Kellow (eds.), Globalization and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar); pp. 27-40.
Campbell, Laura B. (1999). In Chambers, ed., Global Climate Governance: A Report on the
Inter-Linkages between the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Regimes (Tokyo:
United Nations University).
Center for Clean Air Policy (2000). Recommendations on the Implementation of International
Emissions Trading and Related Inventory, Review and Compliance Procedures and
Mechanisms (Washington, DC: Center for Clean Air Policy).
Chambers, W. Bradnee (ed.) (1999). Global Climate Governance: A Report on the Inter-
Linkages between the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Regimes (Tokyo: United
Nations University).
Chambers, W. Bradnee (1999). ‘International Trade Law and the Kyoto Protocol.’ In
Chambers (ed.), Global Climate Governance: A Report on the Inter-Linkages between
the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Regimes (Tokyo: United Nations University).
Charnovitz, Steve (1998),’Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement’, The
International Lawyer, 32: 901-21.
Cottier, Thomas (2001). ‘Risk Management Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement,’ in
David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow (eds.), Globalization and the Environment: Risk
Assessment and the WTO (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar); pp. 41-62.
Dehlavi, Ali (2000). GATT/WTO Rules and the Compatibility with the Transaction of
ERUs/AAUs/CERs. ICTSD/RIIA Side Event to UNFCCC/COP-6. www.ictsd.org.
Egenhofer, Christian, and Thomas Legge (2002). What it takes a trader to trade? The
emerging regulatory and market conditions for Greenhouse Gas emissions trading in
Europe. Draft report of the CEPS Working Party on Emissions Trading and the new
EU- climate change policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Esty, Dan (1994). Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics).
Ferman, G. (1997). International Politics of Climate Change (Oslo: Scandinavian University
Press).
Forsyth, Tim (1999), International Investment and Climate Change (London: RIIA and
Earthscan).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn.
(Geneva: GATT).
Gentry, Bradford (1997). ‘Making Private Investment Work for the Environment’, in Finance
for Sustainable Development: The Road Ahead (New York: United Nations).
Goldberg, Donald M. (1995). ‘The Framework Convention on Climate Change,’ in Robert
Housman, et al. (eds.), The Use of Trade Measures in Select Environmental
Agreements, Environment and Trade Series, No. 10 (Geneva: United Nations
Environment Program).
Graham, Edward M. (2001). Fighting the Wrong Enemy (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics).
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE WTO
13
Grubb, Michael, Duncan Brack and Christian Vrolijk (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide
and Assessment (London: RIIA and Earthscan).
Hagen, Paul E., and John Barlow Weiner (2001). ‘An Introduction to the Rules of the WTO:
An Environmental, Health and Safety Perspective,’ Trade and the Environment, The
WTO, and MEAs (Washington, DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation); pp. 13-32.
Haverkamp, Jennifer (2001). ‘The Conflict Between the WTO and MEAs – In View of the
U.S. Government, Only a Theoretical Problem,’ in Trade and the Environment, The
WTO, and MEAs. (Washington, DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation); pp. 5-12.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Michael M. Kostecki (1995). The Political Economy of the World
Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Housman, Robert, et al. (eds.) (1995). The Use of Trade Measures in Select Environmental
Agreements, Environment and Trade Series, No. 10. (Geneva: United Nations
Environment Program).
International Energy Agency (2001). International Emission Trading: From Concept to
Reality (Paris: International Energy Agency).
Kellow, Aynsley (2001). ‘Accounting for Risk in Multilateral Negotiations,’ in David
Robertson and Aynsley Kellow (eds.), Globalization and the Environment: Risk
Assessment and the WTO (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar); pp. 119-134.
Kerr, Suzi, (ed.) (2000). Global Emissions Trading (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar).
Krist, William K. (2001). ‘Neither Friends nor Foes, But Neighbors: An Introduction to the
Relationship,’ in Trade and the Environment, The WTO, and MEAs (Washington, DC:
Heinrich Boll Foundation); pp. 1-4.
Marceau, Gabrielle, and Alexandra Gonzalez-Calatayud (2001). ‘The Relationship Between
the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of MEAs and Those of the WTO,’ Trade and the
Environment, The WTO, and MEAs (Washington, DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation); pp.
71-90.
Mueller, Benito (2002). ‘The Kyoto Mechanisms: Linking Technology to Ratification’,
Journal of World Trade, 36, 1: 57-66.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1999). Foreign Direct Investment
and the Environment (Paris: OECD).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1999). Future of Liberalisation of
Trade in Environmental Goods and Services: Encouraging Environmental Protection as
well as Economic Benefits (Paris: OECD).
Parker, Richard W. (1998). Designs for Domestic Carbon Emissions Trading: Comments on
WTO Aspects (Washington, DC: The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics
and the Environment).
Pauwelyn, Joost (2001). ‘Applying SPS in WTO Disputes,’ in David Robertson and Aynsley
Kellow (eds.), Globalization and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar); pp. 63-78.
Petersmann, E-U. (1997). The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System  (London: Kluwer Law
International).
THOMAS L. BREWER
14
Petsonk, Annie (1999). ‘The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Market Place,’ Duke Environmental Law
and Policy Forum, 10, 1: 185-220.
Robertson, David (2001). ‘Introduction,’ in David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow (eds.),
Globalization and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar); pp. 1-11.
Sampson, Gary (1999). ‘WTO Rules and Climate Change: The Need for Policy Coherence.’
In Chambers, W. Bradnee, ed. Global Climate Governance: A Report on the Inter-
Linkages between the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Regimes (Tokyo: United
Nations University).
Sampson, Gary P. (2001). ‘Risk and the WTO,’ in David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow
(eds.), Globalization and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar); pp. 15-26.
Sampson, Gary P. (forthcoming) ‘WTO Rules and Climate Change: The Need for Policy
Coherence’, chapter 4 in (Brussels: CEPS).
Shaw, Sabrina, and Risa Schwartz (2002). ‘Trade and Environment in the WTO,’ Journal of
World Trade, 36, 1 (February): 129-154.
Springer, U. (2000). GATS and the Kyoto Mechanisms: Open Markets for Climate Change
Mitigation Services?, Swiss Review of International Economic Relations, 55: 65-84.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1996). Legal Issues Presented by a
Pilot International Greenhouse Gas Trading System [by Richard B. Stewart, Jonathan
B. Wiener and Philippe Sands] (Geneva: UNCTAD).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] (1996). World Investment
Report 1996: Investment, Trade and International Policy Arrangements (New York and
Geneva: UN).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] (1996). International
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, I: Multilateral Instruments (Geneva: UN).
Vaughan, S. (1997). ‘Tradable Emission Permits and the WTO,’ paper presented at the
European Union Advanced Study Course on Goals and Instruments for the
Achievement of Global Warming Mitigation in Europe (Berlin).
Werksman, Jacob (1999). ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO,’ Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law, 8,3: 251-264.
Werksman, Jacob, and Claudia Santoro (1999). ‘Investing in Sustainable Development: the
Potential Interaction between the Kyoto Protocol and the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment.’ In Chambers, W. Bradnee (ed.), Global Climate Governance: A Report on
the Inter-Linkages between the Kyoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Regimes (Tokyo:
United Nations University).
Werksman, Jacob, Kevin A. Baumert and Navroz K. Dubash (2001). Will International
Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies?, Climate Notes (Washington,
DC: World Resources Institute).
Wiser, Glenn M. (1999). ‘The Clean Development Mechanism Versus the World Trade
Organizaion: Can Free-Market Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free
Trade?,’ Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 11, 3: 531-598.
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE WTO
15
World Trade Organization (1995). The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: WTO).
World Trade Organization, 1996. Report on the Committee on Trade and Environment.
Geneva: WTO. WT/CTE/W/40. [Section II, Item I.]
World Trade Organization, 1997. Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes: Border Tax
Adjustment. WT/CTE/W/47. Geneva: WTO, May 2.
World Trade Organization [WTO] (1998). Environmental Services: Background Note by the
Secretariat (Geneva: WTO).
World Trade Organization [WTO] (1999). Trade and Environment (Geneva: WTO).
World Trade Organization [WTO] (1999). 1999 Report of the Committee on Trade and the
Environment (Geneva: WTO).
World Trade Organization [WTO] (2001), Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference,
Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001. <www.insideustrade.com> February 6,
2002.
Zhang, Zhong Xiang (1998). ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trade
System,’ Journal of World Trade, 32, 5: 219-239.
Zhang, Zhong Xiang, and Lucas Assuncao (nd). ‘Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO’.
